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Abstract
This paper examines the lack of information flow in the credit markets of developing
countries. We show that the miscoordination among financial intermediaries might explain
why lenders don't share their information about the borrowers. The competition effect of
more transparency in the market leads to a higher probability of default of the firm, also
generating credit rationing.
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Several recent empirical papers analyze the credit markets in developing coun-
tries. They show that one of the most prominent features of these markets is
the lack of information ﬂow between lenders. It can be explained as the result
of miscoordination between ﬁnancial intermediaries as shown by Ghosh and
Ray (2001). If lenders have the option of privately collecting information on the
credit histories of new clients, multiple equilibrium could arise. Consequently,
it is possible to interpret limited client information in emerging credit markets
as coordination failure among ﬁnancial intermediaries. Jappelli and Pagano
(1993) argue that a coordination problem can arise also in developed countries
because the information sharing mechanism should be adopted ﬁrst by those
intermediaries that will suffer most for the increased degree of competition in
the market.
Building upon the last results in the global games literature1 we provide a
model in which when there is imperfect knowledge of the fundamentals there
exists a unique equilibrium in which the lenders share the information and
fund the investment project. We modify the approach followed by Morris and
Shin (2004), Hellwig (2002) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) among others to
analyze the incentive of the banks to share their information about borrowers’
quality.
This paper is motivated by two main objectives. The ﬁrst is theoretical. We
show conditions under which the coordination decisions about the underlyng
investment ﬁnancing strategy can be negatively affected by the information
sharing agreement between lenders. This paper sheds new light on some im-
plications never considered in the information sharing literature in credit mar-
kets2. As far as I know this paper is the ﬁrst to underline the possible detrimen-
tal effect on the ﬁrm’s probability of success given by the information sharing
agreement of the lenders. Our second objective is to contribute to the debate
on the regulation of emerging credit markets. In these markets even when in-
formation sharing is welfare enhancing, because it reduces the probability of
default of the project ﬁnanced, lenders don’t share due to a coordination prob-
lem. This leads us to believe that a Public Credit Registry should be created by
the monetary authority to increase the degree of transparency.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model and
state basic assumptions. Section 3 lays out the two stages of the game showing
the main results of the paper. Section 4 concludes while the Appendix provides
proofs.
1For an excellent survey read Morris and Shin (2003).
2For a survey see Jappelli and Pagano (2000)
12 The Model
We consider a two stages game Γ(I, Si, v), where I denotes the set of all play-
ers, S = ￿i2ISi, and Si denotes the binary set of actions for each player i 2 I,
and vi (θ, ai, a￿i) denotes payoff to player i of playing action ai when all other
players follow action proﬁle a￿i, for all (ai, a￿i). Payoffs depend on a funda-
mental variable θ 2 R.
The timing of this inﬁnite player game is as follows: Initially, nature draws
a fundamental θ 2 R from a normal distribution with mean b θ and variance
1
γ. Each player then receives noisy signals about θ and can decide to share
his information making it public. After forming their beliefs about θ, players
simultaneously decide on their action.
We describe the following environment. A ﬁrm’s investment project is sub-
mitted to a set of risk-neutral ﬁnancial intermediaries. These have to decide to
share or not their information and then about the funding of the project whose
proﬁtability is uncertain, because it depends upon the realized value of the
fundamental θ and on the proportion of investors λ that decide to grant the
project. The investors have an outside option given by a risk free investment
whose return is with certain rf. The payoff to invest is V > rf if the propor-
tion of banks who choose to invest exceeds κ (θ), and 0 if less than κ (θ) banks
choose to invest in the project. The value of the fundamental can be interpreted
as a measure of the ﬁrm’s propensity to default.
We impose the following regularity conditions on expected payoffs in the
inﬁnite player incomplete information game:
A.1 For each player i, posterior expectation xi, and strategy proﬁle (ai,a￿i),
Eθ (vi (θ, ai, a￿i)jxi) ! vi (θ, ai, a￿i), as the noise vanishes.
This assumptions rules out the possibility that unboundedly large, but un-
likely negative payoffs inﬂuence a player’s choice of action. We impose the
following additional restriction:
A.2 κ (θ) isstrictlyincreasingandcontinuouslyboundedlydifferentiable, and




= 1 and κ (θ) = 0.
The second assumption requires the existence of dominance regions such
that for all i, under complete information, investing in the project is a strictly
dominant action whenever θ < θ, and not investing is a strictly dominant ac-
tion for player i whenever θ > θ.
Under (A.1) and (A.2), Theorem 1 in Milgrom and Weber (1985) establishes
the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the investment stage of the
incomplete information game, provided that the noise is sufﬁciently small.
The investment stage of the game has multiple equilibria if θ is common




. In one equilibrium, every creditor
invest in the project, in a second equilibrium, not even one grant the loan and
2there exists also a mixed strategy equilibrium in which players randomize with
probability κ (θ).
Weintroducefortheﬁrsttimeinaglobalgamesettinganotherstage, where,
the investors can decide to share the information they receive about θ with the
other investors, before the investment stage of the game. To set up a credit
bureau the lenders have to pay a cost c(λ) which satisﬁes:
A.3 (i) c(λ) is continuously differentiable in λ and bounded over [0,1]; (ii)
c0 (0) > 0 but c0 (λ) < 0 for some λ;(iii) c(λ) is quasi-concave.
This assumption ensures that there is a region over which banks’ actions
are strategic complements: that is, the payoff to each bank of choosing "Share"
increases with the proportion of others who choose to share their information,
when that proportion is sufﬁciently small. When too many intermediaries de-
cide to share their information, banks’ actions become strategic substitutes.
The decision to share the information among lenders has two main effects. The
ﬁrst one is the coordination effect. The creditors are able to update their pos-
terior about the realized value of the fundamental, affecting the coordination
probability of the lenders and then indirectly the proﬁtability of the invest-
ment. The second one is the competition effect. Sharing the information about
the state of the fundamentals increases the possibility of all the competitors to
steal proﬁtable investment opportunities. Even if an explicit description for the
loss caused by the information sharing decision is behind the purposes of this
paper, I am able to analyze the interactions between these two effects on the
incentives of each bank.
3 Summary of the main results




signals about θ :







where β is the precision of private signal. The posterior belief about θ of
bank i is given by:
θNSjxi ￿ N
 







In order to analyze the investment stage of the game when there is infor-
mation sharing we suppose that there is one bank who has the same prior as
3all the investors and receives an additional noisy signal about the proﬁtability
of the investment:







In our setting, this bank could receive better information for a previous re-
lationship with the ﬁrm, or for a better monitoring technology. We will assume
that this bank directly announces y and investors update their prior accord-
ingly. The new prior has mean
θIS =
γb θ + αy
γ + α
(4)
and variance 1/(γ + α). When the credit institutes decide to share their
information the new posterior beliefs are distributed as follows:
θISjxi,y ￿ N
 
γb θ + αy + βxi
γ + α + β
;
1
γ + α + β
!
(5)
As in the global games literature, we restrict attention to symmetric "thresh-
old" equilibria, i.e. pairs of thresholds (x￿,θ￿) such that a bank decides to in-
vest in the project whenever its posterior expectation falls below x￿ and re-
ceives a payoff of V whenever θ < θ￿.
I am now able to state the main result of this section:
Proposition 1 Given the information structure above we have that:
(i) The equilibrium threshold θ￿
NS and θ￿































































γ+α+β! 0. Then there are multiple limit equilibria, all with thresholds con-
tinuous in y.
4Proposition1shedsnewlightupontheinformationsharingproblemamong
lenders. I show that introducing a better informed bank into the market might
bring back multiple equilibria, because the ability of some agents to commu-
nicate with a large proportion of other agents may be sufﬁcient to generate
common beliefs close to 1. We need a sufﬁciently precise private information
toavoidmultipleequilibria. Thisshouldbeconsideredwithinthedebateabout
the necessity of more transparency in emerging markets, as one of the possible
costs. This leads us to the next issue: the inﬂuence on the other creditors that
the revelation of this new information could have on the market equilibrium.
The last statement of Proposition 1 deals with this issue showing that in the
case of multiple equilibria the information revealed to the market would lead
the investors’ strategies with different results.
We are also interested in the actual probability of default, p￿ of the ﬁrm.





IS = Prob(θ > θ￿










NS = Prob(θ > θ￿








We can state the following result about the effect of information sharing on
the probability of default.
Corollary 1 The probability of default p￿
IS < p￿



















The last Corollary underlines the role played by the coordination effect in
the case of information sharing. If the condition identiﬁed above holds, in-
formation revealed by the better informed bank allows the other investors to
coordinate funding the project. Hence if the banks’ private information is suf-
ﬁciently precise, information sharing leads to an increase of efﬁciency.
3.2 Information sharing stage
Inthissectionweanalyzetheconditionsunderwhichitisoptimalforthebanks
to share their information about the proﬁtability of the borrower. When the










V + c(λ) (11)
where ϕ(￿) is the normal density. Assumption A.3 implies that the compe-
tition effect is considered by the banks together with the gain derived from the
5increased probability of success of the project. We consider the case in which
the payoff V depends upon a different market-speciﬁc parameter ξ uniformly
distributed on the real line. This parameter can be interpreted as a measure
of the value of a Credit Bureau in the market, it depends upon the fraction of
high-risky borrowers, mobility of borrowers and barriers to entry as shown by
Jappelli and Pagano (1993). Each agent i receives a private signal ψi = ξ + ηi
where ηi is a random variable drawn uniformly from the interval [￿ε,ε] with
ε > 03. If the agents decide not to share their information the last term in






. Following Milgrom and Weber (1985) we suppose that agents
use distributional strategies deﬁned as a probability measure yi on the Cartesian
product of the player’s type and action space yi : [ξ ￿ ε,ξ + ε] ￿ f1g ! [0,1],
where we have indexed the action "Invest" with 1. We use the following deﬁn-
itions:







IS￿δ zϕ(z)dz ￿ q;






ψ￿ε (qV (ξ) + c(λ(ξ,y)))dξ
￿
yi (ψ).
In order to study the inefﬁciency derived by the miscoordination among
lenders we impose the following restriction:
A.4 (i) q > 0; (ii) V0 (ξ) > 0 for every ξ.
This ensures that it would be efﬁcient to set up a Credit Bureau because it
lowers the probability of default of the ﬁrm, and the gains are increasing in
the state. v(ψ,yi,y) is the expected difference in the payoffs derived from the
information sharing. The following Lemma determines the unique ψ￿ :
Lemma 1 The expected payoff v(ψ,yi,y) of an agent with a signal equal to the switch




Our main result is that the existence of a switching equilibrium requires
that the value generated by the Credit Bureau is sufﬁciently high in order to
compensate for the competition effect. It gives us the possibility to show that the
lack of coordination among the agents leads to an important inefﬁciency.
Proposition 2 (i) In the information sharing stage there exists an equilibrium in
distributional strategies.




2ε ￿ V0 (ψ￿).
(iii) If c(1) < ￿qV (ψ￿) then there is an ε such that when ε < ε, the switching
strategy around ψ￿ is not an equilibrium.
3We don’t think that this assumption plays an important role, but simpliﬁes the calculations.
6The existence result follows one of the latest results in the global games lit-
erature given by Karp et al. (2007). They prove the existence of a switch-
ing strategy equilibrium in a global game in which the actions of the players
can be strategic substitutes. We are able to identify a sufﬁcient condition for
the existence of a switching strategy equilibrium around ψ￿, which requires
that the stealing possibilities opened by the information disclosure among the
lenders are bounded above by the marginal value generated by the Credit Bu-
reau. When this condition is not satisﬁed, the last statement of the proposition
proves that there is no switching equilibrium. This is an important result to
understand: the inefﬁciency generated in the emerging credit markets. We can
consider q a measure of the "information sharing value", hence efﬁciency re-
quires that every time q is positive, lenders should disclose their information
about the borrowers. Our proposition shows that this might not happen if the
banks believe that in this way they would sharpen the degree of competition
in the market.
This has important implications for the credit rationing, in fact, if the in-
vestors don’t coordinate to set up a Credit Bureau some of the banks might
not fund the project, because they don’t have sufﬁciently precise information
about its proﬁtability. Hence in our model credit rationing is not due to a moral
hazard problem of the entrepreneurs, but is caused by a lack of trasparency in
the market.
4 Concluding Remarks
We provide a completely new application for the global game approach, deriv-
ing some important conclusions about the necessity of transparency in emerg-
ing credit markets. We investigate the effects of an increase of communication
among lenders. We ﬁnd that an agreement on sharing information might lead
to multiple equilibria. We show the conditions under which this disclosure
of information is efﬁcient leading to a reduction of the credit rationing in the
market. We also prove that this might not happen due to a prevailing competi-
tion effect. This suggests the necessity for a policy interventation to enhance the
sharing of data and transparency in the credit markets. One could in principle
extend the analysis in the present paper to a dynamic setting in which there
is strategic revelation of the information, introducing interesting issues related
to the credibility of the credit intermediaries. To analyze the econometrics im-
plications of our results could be another promising extension of the current
analysis.
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85 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For the moment, consider the case without informa-
tion sharing. The payoff to "Invest" is V if the threshold state is below θ￿
NS an
investor will fund the project as long as the expected payoff, given his posterior
belief, satisﬁes rf ￿ V Prob(θ < θ￿
NSjxi). The unique threshold expectation x￿,
is given by the payoff indifference condition:
rf= V Prob(θ < θ￿jx￿)= Φ
￿p














Now suppose all agents follow a threshold strategy x￿. The fraction of




























From the monotonicity in the state and in the signal, it follows that the payoff
to "Invest" is V if θ<θ￿
NS, where θ￿






































The intersection of the PI with CM implicitly deﬁne the strategies in any

















The case with information sharing follows directly with γ replaced by γ +
α. This concludes the proof of (i).

























dθ￿ . Equation 12 implies that
dx￿
PI













The case in which there is information sharing is analogous.
9For the last statement of the Proposition ﬁx
(γ+α) p
β = d. For sufﬁciently large
d, d =
κ0(θ)
ϕ(Φ￿1(κ(θ))) has two solutions, which we denote by θ (d) and θ (d) i.e.
the local maximum and minimum of the r.h.s. of 7. Clearly there exist values






2 2 (θ,θ (d)) are supported as
equilibria. As d ! ∞ there are limit equilibria at θ and θ because θ (d) ! θ
and θ (d) ! θ. Equation 7 can be used to identify a critical region for the signal
of the better informed creditor. When the signal falls inside this region there
exists multiple equilibria in one of these, the probability of a successful project
goes to 0, while in the other it goes to 1.
Proof of Corollary. Using equations 6 and 7 we can see that when θ￿
IS = θ￿
NS,









γ + β ￿ γ
p










then by Proposition 1
∂θ￿
IS
∂y > 0 while θ￿
NS does not depend on y, therefore
θ￿
IS > θ￿
NS if y > W. Since the probability of default p￿ is strictly decreasing in
the equilibrium threshold we get the result.
Proof of Lemma. Conditional on receiving the signal ψ￿, the distribution of λ









Proof of Proposition 2.
￿ For the (i) part of the proposition the proof follows that of Proposition 1
in L. Karp et al. (2007). We refer the reader to that proof for more details.
￿ For the (ii) part, conditional on receiving the signal ψ￿, the distribution









At the ψ￿ speciﬁed in the previous Lemma agents are indifferent between




10holds, they strictly prefer to share (not to share) their information when ψ > ψ￿















(ψ ￿ ψ￿ + ε)
￿
















c(1) if ψ￿￿ ψ < ψ￿+2ε
qV0 (ψ) if ψ ￿ ψ￿+2ε
(19)
From the second line of Eq.19,
∂v(ψ,y)
∂ψ > 0 if and only if qV0 (ψ) > ￿ 1
2εc(λ)
by quasi-concavity the latter holds if and only if qV0 (ψ) > ￿ 1
2εc(1). From the
third line of Eq.19
∂v(ψ,y)
∂ψ > 0 if and only if qV0 (ψ) >
c(λ)￿c(1)
2ε for all λ 2 [0,1].




2ε ￿ V0 (ψ￿), which is stronger than
the condition qV0 (ψ) > ￿ 1
2εc(1).
￿ For the part (iii) consider ￿b ξ ￿ c(1) <
R 1
0 c(λ)dλ ￿ ￿qV (ψ￿), then
qV0 (ψ￿) < b ξ. Let ε = (b ξ￿ψ￿)
2 > 0, and suppose that ε < ε. Given such
an ε, the bank who receives a signal of ψ 2
￿
ψ￿ + 2ε,b ξ
￿
knows with
certainty that λ = 1, since ψ > ψ￿ +2ε. But then the expected payoff from
choosing to "share" is therefore qV (ψ) + c(1) < 0. Hence the switching
strategy around ψ￿ cannot be an equilibrium.
11